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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Well established and fundamental requirements to establish alter ego liability or 
otherwise "pierce the corporate veil" are at issue in this appeal. The district court noted an 
"inconsistency in the authorities" as to whether alter ego claims are equitable in nature. May 3, 
2012 Memorandum Decision, at 5-6. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 707-730.) This is significant in determining 
the summary judgment standard that is applicable to such cases and may make this case 
significant on a procedural point that the Supreme Court wishes to resolve. 
A. The district court erred in its analysis in part because it felt that the "Unity of 
Interest" element was lacking despite undisputed evidence that the alleged alter ego companies 
were both wholly owned by the Schelhoms together with the undisputed evidence set forth 
below establishing a lack of economic separateness. See May 3, 2012 Memorandum Decision, 
at 21. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 707-730.) The appropriate test is "whether a unity of interest and ownership 
[exist] to a degree that the separate personalities of the [company] and individual no longer 
exist." Sirius Le v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80 (Idaho 2010). 
B. This case raises matters of first impression only in that the trial court utilized 
factors that traditionally support a finding of a lack of economic separateness to reach the 
opposite conclusion based upon the adoption of the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act in 2008. This decision was apparently reached based upon certain Uniform Law Comments 
found in Idaho Code 30-6-304: 
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corporate realm, of corporate formalities" is a in the piercing 
analysis. In the realm that factor is inappropriate, because informality of 
organization and operation is both common and desired. This not 
preclude consideration of another key piercing factor by an entity's 
owners of the entity's economic owners. 
(Emphasis Added). See May 3, 2012 Memorandum Decision, Page 11-12. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 707-
730.) The district court's error is manifest after review of the examples given by the legislature 
after the excerpted comments above: 
EXAMPLE: The operating agreement of a three-member, member-managed limited 
liability company requires formal monthly meetings of the members. Each of the 
members works in the LLC's business, and they consult each other regularly. They have 
forgotten or ignore the requirement of monthly meetings. Under subsection (b) [(2)], that 
fact is irrelevant to a piercing claim. 
EXAMPLE: The sole owner of a limited liability company uses a car titled in the 
company's name for personal purposes and writes checks on the company's account to 
pay for personal expenses. These facts are relevant to a piercing claim; they pertain 
to economic separateness, not subsection (b) [(2)] formalities. 
Idaho Code 30-6-304 (Emphasis Added). 
To be clear, the district court reached its decision while purportedly liberally construing all facts 
and resolving all inferences in favor of Schism Ablution, LLC I. See May 3, 2012 Memorandum 
Decision, Page 6-7. (R. Vo1.34 pp. 707 -730.) The undisputed facts utilized by the district court to 
I Schism intervened as The Real Party in Interest in this appeal on December 6,2012. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 420-422) 
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find no issue of material fact as to failing to maintain the economic separateness of the company 
follow: 
"Doing Business As" type bank account owned by the Shelhorns and titled with 
the bank as: "Tim Schelhorn, Julie Schelhom DBA Piper Ranch, LLC". [d. at 7. 
Big Bite Excavation, Inc. an Idaho Corporation mvned by the Schelhorns paid the 
invoice of Piper Ranch, characterized by an oversight by Sehelhorns and 
cured by a capital call alier rhe litigation vl'as commenced. [d. at 8. 
The Shelhorn's initial capital to the Piper DBA 
account) was $200.00. $2,600.00 was subsequently deposited in December 2008 
to cover a payment to Alpha and $150.00 in May 2009 to cover bank 
Id. at 8-9. 
The Shelhorns intended to subsequently fund "their contribution [to Piper Ranch. 
LLC in order to fund its obligations] had the project forward." Id. at 
In a similar investment the Schelhorn used their wholly owned company, Big Bite 
Excavation, Inc. to perform Piper Ranch, LLC's contribution oflabor, equipment 
and materials. Big Bite would only be paid for that work if Piper Ranch made 
distributions to it. Id. at 9. 
Piper Ranch, LLC is does not file a separate tax return. Id. at 19. 
C. The appeal also involves well settled law about whether the district court applied the 
wrong standard and erred in refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to assert an alter ego 
claim against Big Bite, and well settled law regarding contractual 3rd party liability. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The initial complaint was filed on May 26, 2009. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 37-44.) Both parties 
made timely jury trial demands. Schism Ablution, LLC2 moved to amend the complaint to assert 
The choses in action of Appellants Liquid Realty, Inc. and Wandering Trails, LLC at issue in this case have 
been assigned to Schism Ablution, LLC, who has intervened as the real party in interest. References to these parties 
will be made as "Schism" unless context requires otherwise. 
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alter ego liability of Big Bite Excavation, Inc. (hereinafter "Big Bite") on March 3, 2010. (R. 
Vol. 1 pp. 134-136.) That motion was denied on July 14,2010. (R. Vol.2 pp.266-280.) Schism 
moved for clarification on July 28, 2010. (R. Vol.2 pp.288-294.) On December 3, 2010 the 
district court denied the motion for clarification, refusing to allow amendment of the pleadings to 
add Schism's alter ego claim against Big Bite. (R. Vol.3 pp.380-395.) 
The Schelhorns moved for summary judgment on Schism's claim that they are the alter 
ego of Piper Ranch, LLC (hereinafter "Piper Ranch") on April 1, 2011. (R. Vol.3 pp.403-414.) 
Schism filed a cross motion for summary judgment on April 14, 2011. (R. Vol.4 pp.585-609.) 
These motions were denied on July 13, 2011. (R. Vol.4 pp.657-660.) Piper Ranch and the 
Schelhorns submitted additional evidence and filed a motion for reconsideration on February 23, 
2012. (R. Vol.4 pp.661-675.) Schism did not request reconsideration on its Summary Judgment 
Motion. The district court granted Piper Ranch and the Schelhorn's motion for reconsideration 
on May 3, 2012. (R. VolA pp.707-730.) A jury trial was scheduled for May 16, 2012. Prior to 
trial, Piper Ranch and Schism entered into a stipulation for entry of two judgments against Piper 
Ranch totaling $260,000 (the "Stipulated Judgment,,)3. The Stipulated Judgment was entered by 
the district court on May 22, 2012. (R. Vol. 4 pp.733-736.) 
Schism timely filed a notice of appeal. (R. Vol.3, pp. 362-373.) 
3. Statement of Facts 
Judgment in favor of Liquid Realty, Inc. was entered in the amount of $135,000 and judgment in favor of 
Wandering Trails, LLC was entered in the amount of $125,000. These judgments each included $25,000 for 
attorney fees and costs. The Stipulated Judgment was assigned to Schism on October 10,2012, 
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In 2006, Liquid Realty, Inc. (LRI) created Wandering Trails, LLC ("WTLLC") for the 
purposes of obtaining and developing the Wandering Trails property for residential use. See 
Affidavit of TJ Angstman in Support of PlaintiffslCounterdefendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (hereinafter "Angstman Affidavit"), ,-r 7. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.) Initially, there were 
three members of that company - LRI, Dan Walters and Mick Bernier. Id.,,-r 17. Ultimately, 
Dan Walters withdrew from the company, leaving LRI with a 75% ownership interest, and Mick 
Bernier with a 25% interest, and the right to distributions from the sale of the property (Bernier 
was the original owner of the property). Id. 
In late 2007, WTLLC was proceeding with the development of the property. It had 
received approval for several administrative lot splits, which allowed it to develop up to 9 
residential lots in 3 quarter sections of the development (Phase 1 contained 6 such lots). Id.,,-r 
18. WTLLC sought bids from various companies for the excavation and paving work required to 
create the roadways to Phase 1. Id.,,-r 19. WTLLC received one such quote from American 
Paving. Id.; Exhibit B. In November 2007, Angstman discussed the American Paving quote 
with Tim Schelhorn. Id.,,-r 20-21; see also Deposition of Tim Schelhorn (hereinafter "Tim 
Schelhorn Depo"), 19:5 - 20:11 (attached to the Affidavit of Matthew T Christensen in Support 
of PlaintiffslCounterdefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Christensen 
Affidavit") as Exhibit B)4 (R. Vol. 3 pp.544-584.) At the time, Angstman knew that Schelhorn 
4 The depositions of both Tim and Julie Schelhom were taken in this matter. At their depositions, both Tim and 
Julie Schelhom testified individually, and on behalf of Piper Ranch, LLC, and Big Bite Excavation, Inc., pursuant to 
30(b)(6) deposition notices. Consequently, the testimony of both Tim and Julie Schelhom is binding on them 
individually and on Piper Ranch and/or Big Bite. This alone is evidence of the close interrelated nature of the 
relationship between Big Bite, Piper Ranch, and the Schelhoms. 
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owned an excavation company, as Schelhorn's company (Big Bite Excavation, Inc.) had 
previously done work on another LRI development. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 20. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-
534.) 
Schelhorn expressed interest in performing the work depicted on the American Paving 
estimate in return for receiving an ownership interest in WTLLC. Id., ~ 21; see also Tim 
Schelhorn Depo, 22:5 - 24:21. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex B.) Based on this expressed interest, 
Angstman prepared a draft Assignment of Limited Liability Company Interest agreement (the 
"Assignment Agreement") and had it and the American Paving estimate (which was Exhibit A to 
the Assignment Agreement) sent to the Schelhorns by an employee of Angstman's law firm. 
Angstman Affidavit, ~ 22 (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534); see also Affidavit of Susan Livingston in 
Support ofPlaintilfslCounterdefendants ' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Livingston 
Affidavit"), ~ 3 and Exhibit A. (R. VoI3.pp.535-543.) 
After a few weeks, the Schelhorns signed the Assignment Agreement (which was in the 
name of their entity, Piper Ranch, LLC) and returned it to WTLLC. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 22-23 
and Exhibit C. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.) The essential terms of the Assignment Agreement were 
that LRI would transfer a 25% ownership interest to Piper Ranch; that Piper Ranch was supposed 
to perform (or have performed on its behalf) work on the project worth approximately 
$160,000.00, the initial scope of which would include pit run, aggregate and paving in 
accordance with the American Paving estimate (hereinafter the "Piper Ranch Work"); that LRI 
would receive a distribution of $60,000 in return for transferring the 25% ownership interest; and 
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that Piper Ranch would then have a capital account of $100,000 after all work was performed. 
See Id. Piper Ranch and/or the Schelhorns understood and do not dispute that $160,000 of work 
was to be performed on the project, and that the initial scope of the work was to include pit run, 
aggregate and paving. See Tim Schelhorn Depo 24:18 - 28:5. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex B.) 
In another project, Shelhorns used Piper Ranch solely as a conduit for work they perform 
through Big Bite. Julie Schelhorn testified specifically about that project, "Circle Z" in which 
Piper Ranch got an ownership interest in exchange for work performed by Big Bite. Big Bite 
performed its work without any contract or payment from Piper Ranch. If it gets paid at all, it 
will get paid from distributions Piper Ranch receives on its project. Depo J Schelhorn, p. 34 L. 
20 - p. 51 L. 3 (attached as Ex. A to the Christensen Aff.) (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584.) 
Further, Piper Ranch and/or the Schelhorns understood that the development of the 
project was dependent on the Piper Ranch Work being performed in a timely manner. The sale 
projections for the lots in the project required the Piper Ranch Work be performed in order to 
obtain the projected sale price for the lots. See Tim Schelhorn Depo, 39:15 - 40:7 (R. Vol.3 
pp.544-584 Ex B); see also Deposition of Julie Schelhorn (hereinafter "Julie Schelhorn Depo"), 
91: 14 - 94:7 (attached to the Christensen Affidavit as Exhibit A). (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584.) 
Furthermore, the Schelhorns or Piper Ranch planned on performing the Piper Ranch Work in 
early spring 2008. Tim Schelhorn Depo, 46:13 - 46:22. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex B.) 
Notwithstanding their understanding that the Piper Ranch Work had to be performed in 2008, 
Piper Ranch and/or the Schelhorns have not performed any work on the Wandering Trails 
development. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 27 and 30 (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534); Julie Schelhorn 
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Deposition, 116: 14-16 (R. Vol.3 pp.S44-S84 Ex A); see Piper Ranch's Response to Request for 
Admission No. 4 [14 J and Response to Request for Admission No. 5 [15 J (attached to the 
Christensen Affidavit as Exhibit D). (R. Vol.3 pp.S44-S84.) In September of 2008, after the 
assignment agreement with "Piper Ranch" was fully executed, at a meeting with Schelhoms, 
Wandering Trails, and the project lender, Alpha Lending, LLC, Schelhoms confirmed to Alpha 
that they would be doing the excavation and paving work for the project. Aff. Angstman ~ 24. 
(R. Vol.3 pp.476-S34.) In reliance on those representations, Wandering Trails told Alpha 
Lending it would not need to take further construction draws, (that were otherwise available) to 
complete the first phase of the project. Id. 
At the time that Piper Ranch received the 2S% interest in WTLLC, it had less than $200 
in capital in the company. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, 139: 7-17. (R. Vol.3 pp.S44-S84 Ex A.) 
Piper Ranch has never had the capital funds available to pay for or perform $160,000 of work on 
the Wandering Trails project. See Id.: see also Tim Schelhorn Depo, 46:23 - SO:10. (R. Vol.3 
pp.S44-S84 Ex R) Furthermore, the Schelhoms did not have the ability to capitalize Piper 
Ranch in early 2008 in order to pay for that work to be performed. See Tim Schelhorn Depo, 
46:23 - so: 1 O. Id. This was never disclosed to Schism. Tim and Julie Schelhom are the sole 
members and managers of Piper Ranch, and they exercise complete control over the company. 
See Piper Ranch's Response to Request for Admission No. 9 (attached to the Christensen 
Affidavit as Exhibit C). (R. Vol.3 pp.S44-S84.) Further, Piper Ranch does not maintain a 
business bank account - rather, Tim and Julie Schelhom maintain a bank account "dba Piper 
Ranch." See Julie Schelhorn Depo, 140:10 - 141:8. (R. Vol.3 pp.S44-S84.) Piper Ranch does 
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not file its own separate tax returns - rather, the corporate distinctions between Piper Ranch and 
the Schelhorns are completely disregarded for tax purposes. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, 124:24-
125:16 (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex A); see also Affidavit of Teresa L. Pulliam in Support of 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (filed on or around April 1, 2011), ~ 4. (R. 
Vol.3 pp.415-419.) Piper Ranch also uses a separate entity, Big Bite Excavation, Inc., to pay at 
least some of its obligations. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, 48:13 - 50:14; 123:12 - 124:20 and 
Exhibit 14. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex A.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err concluding there was no material question of fact 
regarding the unity of interest between Respondents Tim and Julie Schelhorn (the "Schelhorns") 
and their closely held entity, Piper Ranch, and entering summary judgment dismissing Schism's 
claims against Schelhorns seeking to impose liability for the obligations of Piper Ranch on the 
basis of alter ego / entity piercing? 
2. Did the trial court err concluding there was no material question of fact 
regarding Schism's rights as third party beneficiaries to a contract between Piper Ranch and Big 
Bite, and entering summary judgment dismissing Schism's claims for breach of contract and 
breach ofthe covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Big Bite? 
3. Did the trial court err concluding there was no material question of fact 
regarding Schism's claims that they relied, to their detriment upon promises by Big Bite and 
entering summary judgment dismissing Schism's promissory estoppel claims against Big Bite? 
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4. Did the trial court err concluding there was no showing of fact regarding 
the unity of interest between Big Bite and the commonly owned entity, Piper Ranch, and 
refusing to allow Schism to amend their claims against Big Bite to hold it liable for the 
obligations of Piper Ranch due to alter ego/entity piercing? 
5. To the extent the trial court erred in deciding Schism's claims against Big 
Bite Excavation did the trial court err in finding Big Bite a prevailing party and awarding it 
attorney fees and costs? 
6. Is Schism entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal? 
III. ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review for Summary JUdgmentfrom a Where a Jury Trial is Pending on 
Other Issues and an Alter Ego Claim is Alleged. 
The district court was unsure of which standard to apply on the Shelhorn's motion for 
reconsideration of the denial of their second summary judgment motion. At the time this issue 
was decided by the district court a jury trial was looming. The district court was considering 
whether the specific issue of alter ego liability was equitable in nature and therefore a different 
standard would apply in spite of the jury issues on the remainder of the claims. Since the district 
court was unsure what standard to apply, it stated, "For the purposes this decision. the court 
liberally construed the facts and inferences contained in the existing record favor of Schism 
and decided on basis that it was an to be submitted to a jury." May 3, 2012 
Memorandum Decision, Page 6. (R. VolA pp.707-730.) While the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recently concluded that there is no right to a jury trial on alter ego claims, the district court 
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observed that there were conflicting Idaho Supreme Court cases and that the case concluding 
there was no right to a jury trial was internally inconsistent. Id. (discussing T 
Company Inc .. v. Knudson. et ai, 14.f. Idaho 1 (2007)(noting conflicting analysis 
with VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 109 7 (2005)(jury trial 
approved); v. Idaho 604, 61 l14 974, 987 
(2005)( discussing jury for alter claim); and 0. C. v. Burrifo LLC Not 
Reported in F.Supp.2d. 2008 2397678 D.ldaho,2008 (analyzing Idaho Supreme Court 
decisions and finding a right to a jury trial on alter claims). 
Arguments for and against holding alter ego claims are set forth succinctly in United 
States v. Vacante, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73962 (E.D. Cal. 201O)(holding that the claim is legal 
and therefore should be submitted to a jury). 
1d 
Plaintiff acknowledges that other cases have focused on the money judgment 
sought and found the right to a jury trial. In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 469, 
476 (D.N.J. 2005), examined the issue of whether the nature of the relief in an action to 
pierce the corporate veil is legal or equitable. Id. at 476. The court essentially concluded 
that "[c]ommon sense" shows that "no party seeks to pierce the corporate veil merely to 
strip a company of its corporate protection; the underlying purpose of a veil-piercing 
claim in a lawsuit seeking the determination of damages is to obtain monetary relief." Id. 
at 477. The court concluded it was a legal remedy and denied the motion to strike the jury 
demand. 
Plaintiff also cites Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 
1098 (C.D.Cal. 2008) to support its position that there is no right to a jury trial on the 
alter ego issue. In Siegel, the court considered whether the alter ego doctrine was legal or 
equitable in nature. As with Chromas Tech, the Siegel court noted that the historical 
inquiry was inconclusive, with the alter ego doctrine sounding in both law and equity. Id. 
at 1144. Accordingly, the court focused its analysis on whether the nature of the remedy 
was legal or equitable. Id. at 1144. In so doing, the Siegel court acknowledged other court 
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decisions finding that the remedy of piercing the corporate veil was legal in nature 
because the result of the determination would be monetary damages against those behind 
the veil. However, the court found the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Chromas Tech 
persuasive and determined that it was the nature of the relief sought, not the ultimate 
result, that was dispositive. Id. at 1136. The Siegel court then considered the nature of the 
alter ego doctrine under California law. The court determined that even if all the 
objective factors of alter ego were present (i.e., factual determinations), there must still be 
an equitable assessment of whether maintaining the corporate form would be 
"inequitable," which was a matter of discretion. Id. at 1144. The court found that this 
inherent discretionary nature had caused courts to comment that such an action rests with 
the court of equity, not law. Id. at 1144 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Siegel court 
concluded that the alter ego claim was one sounding in equity to which no right to a jury 
trial existed at common law. Id. 
United States v. Vacante, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73962 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
The "inconsistency" noted by the district judge is explained by virtue of the fact that the 
Supreme Court was reviewing cases that had already been tried to jury. The issue was the 
propriety of the language in the instructions given to the jury, not the right to a jury trial in the 
first instance. See Knudson, at 556; VFP VC v. Dakota Co., at 334; Maroun at 617. Moreover, 
the jury verdicts could have been advisory in nature since the cases involved other legal claims. 
The Supreme Court does not need to address the "inconsistency" noted by the district 
court to apply the correct legal standard, here. This is because if the district court applied the 
correct standard, the Supreme Court will review it, de novo. Ada County Bd. of Equalization v. 
Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202 (Idaho 2005). Since the district court did not resolve any 
conflicting inferences in favor of Schelhorn, the primary distinction between the two standards 
on review, evaluating whether the record reasonably supports any inferences drawn by the 
district court against the non-moving party, is unnecessary. May 3, 2012 Memorandum Decision, 
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at 6. (R. Vol.4 pp.707-730.) Although the district court stated it would reach the same result 
under either standard, it decided the case without resolving any inferences against Schism. Id. 
In purely equitable cases5 "the action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial 
court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 
685, 691-92 (2004). This Court freely reviews the entire record to ascertain if either party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and determines whether the record reasonably supports 
the inferences drawn by the district judge. P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable 
Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme 
Court may still direct entry of judgment against the Schelhorns if the entire record demonstrates 
that Schism was actually entitled to summary judgment. Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 
Idaho 9 (Idaho 2010). The district court asserted it resolved no inferences in favor of the 
Schelhorns. Schism contends that even if the district court "resolved" the undisputed facts 
identified in the May 3, 2012 Memorandum Decision to reach this result, such would not be 
reasonable and would in fact promote the use of the limited liability companies in a manner 
inconsistent with the public policy of this state. 
2. The Official Comments to Idaho Code §30-6-304 thereto did not modify the law. 
The cases speak to the "action" rather than distinct claims. At the time summary judgment was granted, the 
trial would have included other claims that were clearly legal in nature. Since final judgment has now been entered 
against Piper Ranch, this would no longer be the case. 
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The Schelhorns argued extensively, below, that the comments to Idaho Code §30-6-304 
have modified the law. However, that is not the case. 
In Sirius LC v. Ericson. 150 Idaho 80, 244 P.3d 224 (2010), the Supreme Court observed: 
Idaho recognizes that a limited liability company (company) is a separate legal 
entity "distinct from its members." See I.C. § 30-6-104(1) .,. To prove that a 
company is the alter ego of a member of the company, a claimant must 
demonstrate "(1) a unity of interest and ownership to a degree that the separate 
personalities of the [company] and individual no longer exist and (2) if the acts 
are treated as acts of the [company] an inequitable result would follow." 
Id. at 85, 244 P.3d at 229 (quoting Vanderford Co. v. Knudson. 144 Idaho 547, 556-57, 165 P.3d 
261,270-71 (2007)). Significantly, this statement of the applicable rule follows the effective date 
of Idaho's Revised Limited Liability Company Act. See Idaho Code 30-6-1104. Therefore, 
nothing in the Revised Act changes the basic test. 
Notably, the Sirius court relied on Vanderford as authority for the alter ego test. In 
Vanderford, the Court relied upon Surety Life Ins. Co v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 
599, 514 P. 2d 594 (1973). 144 Idaho at 557, 165 P.3d at 271. In Surety L(fe, the Court 
explained that alter ego is necessarily case specific. "It is the general rule that the conditions 
under which a corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to the circumstances of each 
case." 95 Idaho at 601,514 P.2d at 596. 
The Surety Life Ins. case gives a good illustration of the flexibility of the alter ego test. It 
went on to examine a number of different factors bearing on the lack of separateness between the 
company and owners, including: 
(1) the individual defendants were the sole owners of the companies; 
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(2) the individuals held total management control over the companies; 
(3) the individuals observed no corporate formalities; 
(4) different companies owned by the individuals would "help" each other, such as using 
one company to perform the tasks of another, without full reimbursement; and 
(5) that the individuals would offset losses of one company with the gains of another. 
See Surety L!fe Ins. Co., 95 Idaho at 602, 514 P.2d at 597. What is important to note is that the 
court was not following a script of elements, but rather looking at the entirety of the 
circumstances to determine whether there was any separateness between the entity and the 
individuals. That case demonstrates that the analysis is a multifaceted inquiry based upon all the 
relevant evidence, as opposed to a slavish examination of one or two factors. 
Finally, Schelhorns relied upon Idaho Code 30-6-304 and its comments to argue what is 
"relevant" to the questions posed by the alter ego test. However, that determination is not within 
the constitutional authority of the legislature, and, therefore, not binding on this court. 
"Relevance" is defined by Idaho Rule of Evidence 401. The rules of evidence are established by 
the courts, not the legislature.6 
6 Idaho Code 1-212 and 213 make it clear that the legislature recognizes the judiciary's 
inherent power "to make rules governing procedure in all the Courts ofIdaho." R. E. W Constr. 
Co. v. District Court, 88 Idaho 426, 432 (1965). Further, Idaho Code 1-214 goes as far as to 
authorize the Idaho Supreme Court to appoint certain persons to help in making such rules. See 
id. at 432. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that "[ s ]ince the promulgation of rules of 
procedure is an inherent attribute of the Supreme Court and an integral part of the judicial 
process, such rules cannot be abridged or modified by the legislature." State v. Currington, 108 
Idaho 539, 541 (1985). 
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3. Well Establislted Precedent Sltould Guide tlte Court 
This case is governed by existing case law. The Supreme Court should adhere to 
precedent. When there is controlling precedent in Idaho law, "the rule of stare decisis dictates 
that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." Miller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 289, 92 P.3d 537, 539 (2004) 
(citing Houghland Farms, Inc v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 803 P.2d 978,983 (1990». 
4. Tlte Trial Court Erred Concluding tltat tlte Undisputed Facts Require Judgment in 
Favor of tlte Scllelltorns on tlte Unity of Interest and Ownersltip element of tlte Alter 
Ego Claim. 
Facts which traditionally lead to a finding unity of interest were instead used to support 
the opposite result here. These facts will be discussed in turn here, along with case citations 
This issue also raises an Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1 concern of separation of powers 
between the legislature and the judiciary. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 13 provides: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or 
jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but 
the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when 
necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts 
below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this 
Consti tution. 
See R.E. W Constr. Co. at 437 (stating that "the provisions of Art. 5, § 13 thereof, grants only 
limited authority to the legislature to enter into the judicial field of rule-making when the 
necessity therefor (sic) appears."). Further, pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1, the legislature 
is not permitted to exercise its power to reject any rules rightfully belonging to the jUdiciary. See 
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 670 (1990). 
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wherein the same or similar evidence to prove the "Unity of Interest" prong7 in the alter ego 
claim. 
The Schelhorns submitted extensive argument asserting their interpretation of evidence, 
below. However, the district court purportedly resolved all inferences in favor of Schism. Thus, 
the question on review by the Supreme Court is not whether the Schelhorns can justify their 
view, but rather whether there is a competing view8. In this case, since the undisputed evidence 
can only reasonably be interpreted to support an alter ego finding, the Court should direct entry 
of judgment against the Schelhorns. 
Unity of ownership and interest is an issue examines the substance of an entity, rather 
than its form. That is the reason why the finder of fact should look at the ownership, control, 
economic separateness, and other evidence that shows that an entity is not independent or 
substantively separate from its owners. In this case, there is abundant evidence that supports a 
finding that Piper Ranch has no substance apart from Tim and Julie Schelhorn. 
The fact that Schelhorns filed paperwork with the Secretary of State to form Piper Ranch 
is inconsequential and merely begs the question. If the entity were not validly formed, then there 
would be no veil to pierce. The question is not whether the entity exists, but what it is, in 
substance. 
This is sometimes referred to as "domination" in Idaho and other jurisdictions. Ross v. Coleman Co., 114 
Idaho 817 (Idaho 1988)(discussing parent / subsidiary liability similar to the Big Bite claim that the district court 
refused to allow in an amended pleading). 
Of course, in its review, the Supreme Court reviews the entire record to determine whether either party is 
entitled to summary judgment. P.D. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 
P.3d 870, 874 (2007). 
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There is no dispute that Big Bite and Piper Ranch are closely held and controlled 
exclusively by the Schelhoms. This is important because it demonstrates that Schelhoms are 
accountable to nobody but themselves for the actions they take in the name of either company. If 
there were other interested owners or managers, then the fact of accountability to other interested 
parties would give the company distinction from its owners. However, that is not the case, here. 
The Schelhoms actual use of that exclusive, unaccountable, control over Piper Ranch is what 
becomes important to this inquiry. This factor has been found to be critical in finding "identity 
of interest" in many Idaho cases. See Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1997); Elsaesser v. Cougar Crest Lodge, L.L.C (In re Weddle), 353 B.R. 892 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2006) (holding that the unity of interest and ownership does not need to be wrongful or 
impermissible, a showing that the person was the managing member of the LLC was sufficient 
even where the conduct showing unity of interest and ownership is consistent with the LLC 
statute and the operating agreement.); Serenic Software, Inc. v. Protean Techs., Inc., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31311 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2007) (holding sufficient unity of interest and ownership 
where husband and his wife are the sole shareholders and officers of Protean, an S Corporation 
for which husband serves as president); EEOC v. Burrito Shoppe LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45540 (D. Idaho June 10, 2008) (holding that fact that the defendant has been the sole owner the 
businesses demonstrates that he exercised "absolute control" over the management and 
operation. "This is one of the factors courts must consider when determining the unity of interest 
and ownership element." !d. at 8-9.); Chick v. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 483 (Idaho 1975)(Finding, 
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"in essence, Tomlinson was running a one-man show. The identities have indeed merged, thus 
satisfying the first part of the rule in Surety Life."). 
The evidence in record shows that Piper Ranch is nothing more than an empty conduit for 
the business dealings of the Schelhorns. First, the original business proposition, its substance and 
terms were all originated with Tim Schelhorn.9 The only reason for the discussion was that 
Schelhorns, not Piper Ranch, own an excavation company (Big Bite Construction, Inc.) that is 
capable of doing necessary work for the development project. 10 This was plainly important, 
9 Wandering Trails, through Angstman or LRI, had sought bids from various companies 
for the excavation and paving work required to create the roadways to Phase 1. Affidavit ofTJ 
Angstman filed April 14,2011 (Angstman Affidavit), para. 19. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534). 
Wandering Trails received one such quote from American Paving. Id.; Exhibit B. In November 
2007, Angstman discussed the American Paving quote with Tim Schelhorn. Id., para 20-21; see 
also Deposition of Tim Schelhorn attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Matthew T. 
Christensen filed on April 14, 2011 (hereinafter "Tim Schelhorn Depo"), 19:5 - 20: 11. (R. Vol.3 
pp.544-584 Ex B.). 
Schelhorn expressed interest in performing the work depicted on the American Paving estimate 
in return for receiving an ownership interest in Wandering Trails. Aff. Angstman, para. 21(R. 
Vol.3 pp.476-534); see also Tim Schelhorn Depo, 22:5 - 24:21. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584 Ex B.). 
Based on this expressed interest, Angstman prepared a draft Assignment of Limited Liability 
Company Interest agreement (the "Assignment Agreement") and had it and the American Paving 
estimate (which was Exhibit A to the Assignment Agreement) sent to the Schelhorns by an 
employee of Angstman's law firm. Angstman Affidavit, para. 22 (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.); see 
also Affidavit of Susan Livingston in Support of PlaintifftlCounterdefendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed April 14, 2011 (hereinafter "Livingston Affidavit"), para. 3 and Exhibit 
A. (R. Vol.3 pp.535-543). 
10 During the negotiations, Angstman knew that Schelhorn owned an excavation company, 
as Schelhorn's company (Big Bite Excavation, Inc.) had previously done work on another Liquid 
Realty development. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 20. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534). 
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considering that the substance of the transaction involved the performance of $160,000.00 worth 
of excavation work. II 
Piper Ranch, initially and at the time of the negotiations, had no capital, and no ability to 
perform any construction work without Schelhorns and Big Bite. 12 The Shelhorns only asked for 
paperwork to be prepared in the name of that company as an apparent afterthought, and not 
because Piper Ranch could or would do anything. The Schelhorns' only explanation is that "it 
best [sic] to have Piper Ranch enter into the Assignment." Aff. J Schelhorn para 3, Ex A. (R. 
VolA pp.676-693.) 
In another project, the Shelhorns have used Piper Ranch solely as a conduit for work they 
perform through Big Bite. Julie Schelhorn testified specifically about another project, "Circle Z" 
in which Piper Ranch got an ownership interest in exchange for work performed by Big Bite. 
Big Bite performed its work without any contract or payment from Piper Ranch. If it gets paid at 
II The essential terms of the Assignment Agreement were that Liquid Realty would transfer 
a 25% ownership interest to Piper Ranch; that Piper Ranch was supposed to perform (or have 
performed on its behalf) work on the project worth approximately $160,000.00, the initial scope 
of which would include pit run, aggregate and paving in accordance with the American Paving 
estimate (hereinafter the "Piper Ranch Work"); that Liquid Realty would receive a distribution of 
$60,000 in return for transferring the 25% ownership interest; and that Piper Ranch would then 
have a capital account of $1 00,000 after all work was performed. See Angstman Affidavit, paras. 
22-3, Ex. C (R. Vol.3 ppA76-534); see also Tim Schelhorn Deposition p. 24 L. 18 - p. 28 L 5 
(attached as Exhibit B to the Christensen Aff.). (R. Vo1.3 pp.544-584). 
12 At the time that Piper Ranch received the 25% interest in Wandering Trails, it had less 
than $200 in capital in the company. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, attached as Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Matthew T. Christensen filed April 14, 2011, p 139, Ll. 7-17. (R. Vo1.3 pp.544-
584). Piper Ranch has never had the capital funds available to pay for or perform $160,000 of 
work on the Wandering Trails project. See Id; see also Tim Schelhorn Depo, p 46, L.23 - p. 50, 
L.lO. (R. Vo1.3 pp.544-584 Ex B). 
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all, it will get paid from distributions Piper Ranch receives on its project. Depo J Schelhorn, p. 
34 L. 20 - p. 51 L. 3 (attached as Ex. A to the Christensen Aff.) (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584.) Unless 
the Schelhoms claim that they were fraudulently representing that they had the ability to perform 
the work required by the contract with Wandering trails, it is very easy to infer that their 
intention was to act similarly in this case. 
The use of Piper Ranch as a conduit for work performed by Schelhom's other companies, 
and the free flow of funds and work between the companies without apparent agreement or 
obligation is remarkably similar to the facts of Surety L!fe Ins. Co v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 
where the court found such conduct demonstrated a lack of separateness between the entity and 
its individual owners. 95 Idaho at 600, 514 P.2d at 595. While there are not a great number of 
these transactions, it "is the general rule that the conditions under which a corporate entity may 
be disregarded vary according to the circumstances of each case." Surety L!fe Ins. Co. v. Rose 
Chapel Mortuary, 95 Idaho 599 (Idaho 1973). In particular, it isn't the number of transactions 
that are problematic, but of few the transactions Piper Ranch engaged in, most were problematic 
(dealings with Big Bite on the Circle Z deal; having Big Bite pay Piper Ranch invoices; no actual 
transfer of ownership of funds to Piper Ranch). 
Although the Schelhoms disputed the significance of the evidence regarding the lack of 
business formality or separateness between themselves and Piper Ranch, the evidence is still 
relevant and important because it is entirely consistent with the nature of Piper Ranch as a 
conduit entity, rather than one of substance. For instance, "Piper Ranch's bank account" is really 
an account held in the name of Schelhoms. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, p. 140, L.1 0- p. 141, L. 8 
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(R. Vol.3 pp.544-584); see also Aff. 1. Schelhorn, Ex. B, F. (R. Vol.4 pp.676-693.) It is without 
dispute that "dba" simply indicates an alias, and not an entity designation. The simple truth of 
the matter is all of the money in that account belongs to Shelhoms, and it passes through Piper 
Ranch only at their discretion. A literal reading of the title in which that bank account was held is 
a proxy for the fmding by the Supreme Court in favor of Schism on this prong of the alter ego 
analysis: "Tim Shelhorn, Julie Schelhorn DOING BUSINESS AS Piper Ranch, LLC". 
Recognizably, Schelhoms claimed that they treated the funds in their "dba" account 
differently from their other funds. However, in Surety Life Ins. Co v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, 
Inc., those owners also maintained separate books for their separate companies. 95 Idaho at 600, 
514 P.2d at 595. Notwithstanding, their entities were found to be alter egos. The necessary 
conclusion is that even if the Schelhoms treated their personal funds in the "dba" account 
differently, that does not change the substance of the matter that they are Schelhom's funds, and 
were available for attachment by the Schelhorn's personal creditors. 
As the district court pointed out, the Schelhoms did not capitalize Piper Ranch, but 
intended to capitalize it "as needed" with their own funds. May 3, 2013 Memorandum Decision 
at pp 21-22 (R. VolA pp. 707-730); Julie Schelhom depo. Pg 114-115. (R. Vo1.3 pp.544-584 Ex 
A.) Undercapitalization is often used to establish the second prong of alter ego liability, injustice 
resulting from not being able to satisfy a judgment resulting from business conduct. Thriftway 
Lumber Co. v. Tisherman, 105 Idaho 668 (Idaho 1983). Here it is also evidence of how the 
Schelhoms treated Piper Ranch as their alter ego rather than a separate entity that would need to 
have its own funds on hand to comply with the contracts they signed on Piper Ranch's behalf. 
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Inexplicably, the district court construed this as favorable to the Schelhorns, but it is inescapable 
that this factor strongly favors Schism. See Tom Nakamura, Inc. v. G & G Produce Co., 93 
Idaho 183, 184 (Idaho 1969); Minich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911 (Idaho 1979) 
(Holding that Frank and Bertha Marcum were liable as alter egos since they were personally 
doing business as Gem State Developers, Inc.) See generally, FTC v. Data Med. Capital, Inc., 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3344 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15,2010). 
Schism pointed out to the district court the actual payment of Piper Ranch bills with 
accounts from Schelhorn's other company, Big Bite. 13 Schelhorns later submitted testimony and 
exhibits in order to attempt to nullify this fact. See Aff J. Schelhorn paras. 20-24, Ex. D, E, and 
F. (R. VolA pp.676-693.) However, a quick review of this information shows that these 
transfers were all executed at the end of July 2011, following the district court's findings that 
there was a material question of fact regarding Schelhorn's alter ego liability. Certainly 
transactions that are quite patently designed to influence the outcome of this litigation raise a 
material question of fact as to their motivation and timing. 
Other factors demonstrating the close nature of the Schelhorns, Piper Ranch and the 
Schelhorn's other company also remain relevant. 14 Regardless of whether LLC's have less 
13 Piper Ranch has a separate entity, Big Bite Excavation, Inc., to pay at least some of its 
obligations. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, p. 48, L. 13 - p. 50, L.14; p. 123 L.12 - p.124 L. 20 and 
Exhibit 14. (R. Vol.3 pp.544-584) 
14 Piper Ranch does not file its own separate tax returns - rather, the corporate distinctions 
between Piper Ranch and the Schelhorns are completely disregarded for tax purposes. See Julie 
Schelhorn Depo, p. 124, L. 24 - p. 125, L.16 (R. Vo1.3 pp.544-584 Ex. A); see also Affidavit of 
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restrictive requirements under the LLC act and IRS regulations, the fact that this entity structure 
is less formal simply illustrates the greater opportunity and feasibility for owners to use entities 
as mere instrumentalities of the owners. While disregarding the entity for taxation, alone, might 
not make a case for alter ego liability; the fact that it occurs in this case is absolutely consistent 
with the fact of use of Piper Ranch by the Schelhorns as an instrumentality. 15 
5. Allowing the Schelhorns to hide behind Piper Ranch will result in injustice. 
A company is inadequately capitalized when its assets are insufficient to cover its 
potential liabilities, which are reasonably foreseeable from the nature of the company's business. 
See Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 707 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 
Cal2d 576,15 Cal Rptr 641,364 P2d 473, (1961); Lattin, The Law of Corporations, § 15,76-77 
(2d ed 1971). 
The Schelhorns did not capitalize Piper Ranch because they allegedly intended do a 
"capital call" when necessary. May 3, 2013 Memorandum Decision (R. Vol.4 pp.707-730.) 
Failure to initially capitalize a company is evidence supporting Schism. Alpine Packing Co. v. 
HH Keim Co., 121 Idaho 762, 764-65, 828 P.2d 325, 327-28 (Ct. App. 1991); Hutchison v. 
Teresa L. Pulliam in Support of Defendants ' Second Motion for Summary Judgment (filed on or 
around April 1, 2011), para. 4. (R. Vo1.3 pp.415-419) 
15 Schism does not contend it was "improper" for the Shelhorn's to elect to disregard this 
entity for tax purposes. The IRS allows this. Evidence tending to establish a Unity of Interest 
and Ownership does not need to be wrongful conduct. Disregarding the entity for tax purposes 
tends to establish that the Schelhorn's relationship with the entity is substantially interrelated 
since they file the same tax return. 
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Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Ct. App. 1997); Nakamura, Inc. v. G&G 
Produce Co., 93 Idaho 183, 184-85, 457 P.2d 422, 423-24 (1969). An under-capitalized 
company, which contains no or very little capital, thus making collection of any judgment 
against the company substantially futile, is enough to show an inequitable result would follow 
from holding only the company liable. See Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 941 950 P.2d 
1275 (Ct. App. 1997); EEOC v. Burrito Shoppe, LLC, 2008 WL 2397678 (D. Idaho 2008) at * 
4; L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Inadequate capitalization as factor in disregard of corporate entity, 
63 A.L.R. 2d 1051 (1959).16 In effect, the use of the entity ends up perpetuating a fraud on those 
it is transacting business with. 
Piper Ranch is exactly the type of under-capitalized entity envisioned by the alter ego 
doctrine. Here, despite obligating itself to perform (or pay for performance ot) $160,000 worth 
of construction work on the Wandering Trails project, the Schelhoms have only contributed 
$2950.00 to Piper Ranch. See Julie Schelhorn Depo, 139:7-17. (R. Vol.3 544-584 Ex. A.) Much 
of that $2950 has been paid out for various expenses, leaving only a negligible amount in the 
account. Id., 136:19 - 139:17. 
16 Schelhoms contended below, that In re Weddle, 353 B.R. 892 (Bankr. Idaho 2006) 
presents a different standard. They claim that the test requires that Wandering Trails and Liquid 
Realty establish "Piper Ranch LLC was created to perpetuate a fraud" and suggest that standard 
is somewhat different from undercapitalization. However, the Bankruptcy Court in that case 
actually specifically states "[0 ]ne of the accepted arguments under the second prong is that the 
targeted corporation was undercapitalized and thus lacked the resources to pay its debts." 353 
B.R. 899 n. 9. Therefore a closer read of the applicable authority confirms that Wandering 
Trails and Liquid Realty are, in fact, asserting the correct standard. 
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More significantly, the undercapitalization of Piper Ranch was hidden from Schism. The 
Schelhorns used their relationship with Big Bite to obtain this opportunity. The original 
agreement was entered with the understanding that Big Bite would, in fact, be performing the 
excavation work. Furthermore, they repeatedly confirmed and advanced this understanding in 
communications with Schism, its members, and the project lenders. In September of 2008, after 
the assignment agreement with "Piper Ranch" was fully executed, at a meeting with the 
Schelhorns, Schism, and the project lender, Alpha Lending, LLC (hereinafter "Alpha"), the 
Schelhorns confirmed to Alpha that they would be doing the excavation and paving work for the 
project. AfJ. Angstman ~ 24. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.) In reliance on those representations, Schism 
told Alpha, in the presence of the Schelhorns, it would not need to take further construction 
draws, (that were otherwise available) to complete the first phase of the project. Id. Critically, 
Piper Ranch, as a distinct entity, had no funds, equipment or ability to perform the excavation, 
yet it remained silent while Schism altered its position with third parties. The only way to meet 
these promises was for the Schelhorns and their company Big Bite to complete that work as it 
did on the Circle Z project. If they truly intended for only Piper Ranch to be responsible for that 
obligation, then their statements, and silence, were nothing short of false and fraudulent. 
In this case there is substantial evidence of the undercapitalization of Piper Ranch in the 
face of the obligations it had to perform substantial excavation work this absolutely creates an 
inequitable result if the Court allows the fiction of separateness to persist. Since judgments 
totaling $260,000 have been entered and no funds exist to repay that debt. 
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The Court in this case should adhere to stare decisis. The Court has already developed 
substantial law indicating that the facts here are demonstrative of a alter ego case. 
6. The district court erred in refusing to allow an Amended Complaint to pursue an alter 
ego claim against Big Bite. 
The denial of a motion to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading has been served 
is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 
934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997); Raedlein v. Boise Cascade Corp., 129 Idaho 627, 631, 931 P.2d 621, 
625 (1996). The test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) 
whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 
557, 567 (2002) (citations omitted). As to the first requirement, "the grant or denial of an 
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the district court .... " Idaho Schools for Equal 
Education Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 P.2d 644, 
652 (1996) (citations omitted). The district judge in this case did not expressly state his ruling on 
the motion was one of discretion. 
As to the second requirement, "in determining whether an amended complaint should be 
allowed, where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may consider whether the 
new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a valid 
claim." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank NA., 119 Idaho 171, 
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175, 804 P.2d 900,904 (1991) (citations omitted). However, the trial court may not consider the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend 
because that is more properly determined at the summary judgment stage. Thomas, 138 Idaho at 
210,61 P.3d at 567. In Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604 (Idaho 2005) the Court stated: 
"It was certainly proper for the district court to consider whether the proposed amended 
complaint alleged valid claims. However, it was not proper for the district court to require 
Maroun to produce evidence showing Robinson, Skouras, Rousseau, Dunhill and Evans 
were shareholders or owners of Wyreless before permitting the complaint to be amended. 
Therefore, the amendment should not have been denied on that basis." 
Id at 612. Here, the district court made the same error when it held "Wandering Trails argument 
fails with the first element because it has failed to show a unity of interest or ownership between 
Piper Ranch and Big Bite." December 2, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order, at 5. 
(Emphasis added) (R. Vol.4 pp.707-730.) This ruling was in error both because it weighed the 
evidence and was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law. Unity of ownership does 
not require direct ownership of stock. Equitable ownership is sufficient, and evidence exists that 
Big Bite shared or would share in distributions with Piper Ranch from the Circle Z project. This 
was discussed at length in Swenson v. Bushman Inv. Props., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Idaho 
2012). 
Douglas Swenson also takes issue with the fact that his sons were not owners of 
any DBSI entity. As noted, to pierce the corporate veil, there must be a "unity of interest 
and ownership" between the individual and the entity. Idaho courts, however, have not 
squarely addressed whether an individual must be shareholder to be potentially liable for 
corporate debts. Other courts, however, have pierced the corporate veil as to non-
shareholders, even in the face of the same language - "unity of interest and ownership." 
For example, in Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 362 Ill. App. 3d 491,501-02,840 N.E.2d 
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767,298 Ill. Dec. 654 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005), the court explained that its decision to hold a 
non-shareholder liable for corporate debts "is consistent with decisions of courts in other 
jurisdictions that have considered the issue and have concluded that equitable ownership 
in a corporation, demonstrated by control exercised by an individual sought to be held 
liable for corporate debts, may satisfy the "unity of interest and ownership' element of 
piercing the corporate veil." n 1 
FOOTNOTES 
nl Fontana string-cited the following cases in support of its holding: Freeman v. 
Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1997) ("New York courts have 
recognized for veil-piercing purposes the doctrine of equitable ownership, under which 
an individual who exercises sufficient control over the corporation may be deemed an 
'equitable owner', notwithstanding the fact that the individual is not a shareholder of the 
corporation"); Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc., 198 A.D.2d 643, 645, 603 N.Y.S.2d 619 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (nonshareholder defendant may be, "in reality," the equitable 
owner of a corporation where the nonshareholder defendant "exercise[s] considerable 
authority over [the corporation] ... to the point of completely disregarding the corporate 
form and acting as though [its] assets [are] his alone to manage and distribute"); In re 
MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326, 332-33 (D. Mass. 1990) (piercing the corporate veil in 
bankruptcy case to establish debtor as the equitable owner of corporate stock that 
ostensibly was owned by debtor's father, and therefore finding stock subject to turnover 
order); Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544,447 
A.2d 406, 412 (Conn. 1982) ("[S]tock ownership, while important, is not a prerequisite to 
piercing the corporate veil but is merely one factor to be considered in evaluating the 
entire situation. . . . Thus, while the usual case does involve a director, officer or 
shareholder of a corporation, the lack thereof, in an unusual case such as this, would not 
prevent us from imposing liability upon an individual by piercing the corporate veil if the 
evidence demonstrated the requisite level of control and otherwise satisfied the 
instrumentality or other applicable test"); Establissement Tomis v. Shears on Hayden 
Stone, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1355, 1366, n.13 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (declining to find that under 
no set of circumstances could defendant husband be shown to be an alter ego of 
corporation simply because 100% of the corporation's stock was held in his wife's name 
instead of his). 
Swenson v. Bushman Inv. Props., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1058-1059 (D. Idaho 2012). The 
Amended Complaint filed on 7/29/2010 alleged alter ego liability of Big Bite, and the district 
court should have allowed that complaint to go forward. Although the amended complaint was 
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filed, Schism was not allowed to pursue it because, in clarifying its Order on the Motion for 
Leave to Amend, the district court essentially struck this claim. (R. Vol.3 pp.380-395.) 
This was in error both because the district court impermissible weighed the facts before 
discovery could be completed on the claim, and misunderstood the law as to the viability of such 
a claim. Schism should be allowed to pursue this claim on remand. 
7. Judgment against Liquid Realty. Inc. should be reversed. 
a. Summary Judgment was improper as to the Liquid Realty. Inc. Claim 
against Big Bite. 
On July 14,2010 the district court dismissed LRI's claims against Big Bite in its Order 
on Big Bite Excavation, Inc.' s August 6, 2009 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. Vol.2 pp.266-
280.) On March 1, 2012 LRI requested that the district court reconsider its ruling dismissing 
LRI's claims against Big Bite in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Schelhorns' Motion for 
Reconsideration since the evidence adduced on that motion supports either a 3 rd Party 
beneficiary claim or an alter ego claim against Big Bite. The district court declined any relief 
pursuant to that request. 
In early 2008, Tim and Julie Schelhorn were involved in real estate development 
projects. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 3. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.l At that time WTLLC was in the 
process of developing the Wandering Trails project, for which it needed excavation work 
performed. Id. WTLLC had previously obtained a development loan which would pay for the 
excavation work. Id, ~ 4. Tim and Julie Schelhorn had previously performed such excavation 
work for LRI on another project, through their company Big Bite Excavation, Inc. ("Big Bite"). 
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fd, ~ 3; Deposition of Julie Schelhorn (attached to the Second Christensen Affidavit as Exhibit 
A), 33:10 - 19 (hereinafter "Schelhorn Depo"). (R. Vol.2 pp.203-211.l 
At that time, TJ Angstman, the president ofLRI (which, in turn, is the managing member 
of WTLLC), spoke with Tim and Julie Schelhorn about partnering on the Wandering Trails 
project. Angstman Affidavit, ~ 2 & 4. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.) The three discussed the excavation 
and paving bid which Mr. Angstman had previously received from a separate paving company. 
fd, ~ 4. Mr. Schelhorn stated at that meeting that he could do the work through Big Bite in 
exchange for a share ofthe profits from the Wandering Trails project. !d. Ultimately, the parties 
agreed that Mr. and Mrs. Schelhorn would receive a 25% share of the profits from the project. 
fd, ~ 5. The agreement was consummated in the "Assignment of Limited Liability Company 
Interest" (hereinafter referred to as the "Assignment Agreement"). fd, ~ 5 and Exhibit A. 
At the time, Mr. Angstman knew that the Schelhorns were the sole shareholders 
and officers of Big Bite, as well as Piper Ranch, LLC ("Piper Ranch"). fd, ~ 6. Mr. Schelhorn 
initially told Mr. Angstman that taking equity positions in these type of projects was his 
"retirement plan". AngstmanAjjidavit, ~ 21. (R. Vol.3 pp.476-534.) Mr. Schelhorn indicated that 
Big Bite would perform the excavation and paving work required by and contemplated in the 
Assignment Agreement. fd, ~ 7; Bernier Affidavit, ~ 9; Debra's Affidavit, ~ 2. The Schelhorn's 
both stated that the purpose of Big Bite performing the work was to satisfy the obligations to 
WTLLC and LRI pursuant to the Assignment Agreement. fd. Based on the Schelhorn's 
representations as the principals of Big Bite that it would perform the work required for Piper 
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Ranch's capital contribution to WTLLC, the Assignment Agreement was signed, which 
transferred 25% ofthe WTLLC ownership to Piper Ranch. Id., ~ 8. 
Idaho Code allows that a "contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may 
be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." Idaho Code 29-102. "If a 
party can demonstrate that a contract was made expressly for his benefit, he may enforce that 
contract, at any time prior to rescission, as a third party beneficiary." Baldwin v. Leach, 115 
Idaho 713, 715, 769 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App., 1989); Idaho Power Co. v. Hulet, 140 Idaho 110, 
90 P.3d 335 (2004). Here, an agreement was made between Big Bite and Piper Ranch for Big 
Bite to perform the work required of Piper Ranch under the Assignment Agreement. WTLLC 
was an express beneficiary of the Big BitelPiper Ranch agreement - the work performed was 
owed to WTLLC by Piper Ranch under the Agreement. 
Citing Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct. App., 2004), 
Big Bite argued below that WTLLC and LRI were merely "incidental beneficiaries" of the 
contract between Big Bite and Piper Ranch. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Big Bite Excavation. Inc. 's Motionfor Summary Judgment, p. 6-9. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 176-
185.) In Nelson, however, there was no written agreement between any of the parties -
everything was done orally. 140 Idaho at 708. Additionally, in Nelson (and Big Bite's 
Supplemental Memo), the analogy was made to a homeowner, general contractor and 
subcontractor. However, that analogy does not fit the situation at hand here. Piper Ranch was 
more than a simple general contractor for WTLLC. Piper Ranch received a 25% membership 
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interest in the company based on its obligation to perform certain work. Accordingly, it does not 
fit the analogy imposed by Nelson and urged by Big Bite. 
The undisputed evidence established that Big Bite had agreed to perform, and did 
perform, work on behalf of Piper Ranch on a similar project, "Circle Z" without compensation. 
Deposition of Julie Schelhorn (attached to the Affidavit of Matthew T. Christensen in Support of 
Amended Motion to Amend Complaint as Exhibit C), 49:18 - 51:6 (R. Vo1.2 pp.232-265.) Big 
Bite's principals represented that the Wandering Trails project would be done in exactly the 
same fashion. There was a written contract between Schism and Piper Ranch, which described 
the work that was to be performed in return for the membership interest. As the members of 
Piper Ranch are also the corporate officers of Big Bite, Big Bite was aware of the terms of Piper 
Ranch's contract. See New England Nat'[ Bank v. Hubbell, 41 Idaho 129,238 P.308 (1925); 
Stivers v. Signey Mining Co., 69 Idaho 403, 208 P.2d 795 (1949) (knowledge of corporate officer 
is imputed to corporation). With full knowledge of those terms, Big Bite agreed to perform the 
work required of Piper Ranch. This work was performed expressly for Schism's benefit. 
Schism was not merely an incidental beneficiary of Big Bite's work - but was the direct and 
express beneficiary. Accordingly, Schism is allowed to pursue Big Bite for a breach of the 
implied contract. 
Further, "after a contract for the benefit of a third person has been accepted or acted upon 
by that person, it cannot be rescinded without his consent." Baldwin v. Leach, 115 Idaho at 715-
16. Here, Schism acted upon the Big Bite/Piper Ranch agreement by consenting to the 
Assignment Agreement, and transferring ownership interest in WTLLC to Piper Ranch. 
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Accordingly, the Big Bite/Piper Ranch agreement could not be rescinded absent WTLLC's 
consent, which was never given. See Angstman Affidavit, ~ 9. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 476-534.) 
Consequently, as a third-party beneficiary to the Big Bite/Piper Ranch agreement, Schism is 
entitled to enforce that agreement by seeking damages for its breach. Accordingly, the district 
court's order dismissing Schism's claims against Big Bite should be reversed. 
7. Schism is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to JAR 41 and 12-120(3). 
The trial court entered a Judgment Regarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees against Schism 
in the amount of $8,039.25. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 396-397.) This was based upon the trial court's 
finding that Big Bite was the "prevailing party". (See IRCP 54 (d)(1)(A». To the extent the trial 
court is reversed, Big Bite can no longer be considered a "prevailing party," and thus, the award 
of costs and attorneys' fees should be vacated, and the matter remanded. 
On appeal, where there is a legal basis for a prevailing party to be awarded their attorney 
fees, the Supreme Court may grant such fees. Idaho Appellate Rule 41. In this case, fees and 
costs should be awarded to Schism because the matter involves a "commercial transaction." 
[I]n any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing 
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be 
taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
Idaho Code 12-120(3). This case involves negotiations between a real estate developer and 
excavation contractors(together with their corporate privies) for the sale of membership interests 
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and to perform construction work on a residential subdivision. This suit arose out of this 
transaction. Moreover, should Schism prevail, it requests costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
40. It is upon these bases that Schism requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Schism requests the Court reverse the trial court, vacate the 
judgment against Schism and remand the matter with directions to the trial court to enter 
judgment!7 in favor of Schism on their alter ego claims against the Schelhorns and to conduct a 
jury trial on the Schism claims against Big Bite. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013. 
lsi 
WYATT B. JOHNSON 
17 Or reverse the district court's summary judgment decision. 
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